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SETTING A PRECEDENT ABOUT PRECEDENT: 
WILLIAM RICHMAN ON  
FEDERAL APPELLATE JUSTICE 
Amy E. Sloan 
N 2000, the Eighth Circuit held in Anastasoff v. United States1 that the 
practice of issuing nonprecedential2 opinions is unconstitutional.  
Although the decision was later vacated, it launched a wave of scholarship 
debating, defending, criticizing, and explaining the federal appellate courts’ 
practice of issuing opinions that do not count as binding precedent.3 
As it turns out, we were all a little bit late to the party.  Professor William 
Richman and his frequent collaborator Professor William Reynolds had already 
critiqued nonprecedential opinions in their seminal 1978 article in the Columbia 
Law Review, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication and No-
Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals.4  In that article, they 
 
  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Baltimore 
School of Law.  I want to thank to Andrea Murphy for research assistance on this article.  © 2014 
by Amy E. Sloan.  All rights reserved. 
I am honored to contribute an essay to this symposium celebrating Professor William 
Richman’s scholarship.  I first read his scholarship in 1998 when I began teaching Appellate 
Practice.  Ten years later, we became acquainted when he served as an outside reviewer of my 
scholarship in conjunction with my promotion to Professor of Law.  Since then, he has given me 
generous feedback on my work, and I greatly value his support and guidance.   
 1. Anastasoff v. United States, 233 F.2d 838, 900, vacated en banc as moot, 235 F.2d 1054 
(8th Cir. 2000). 
 2. I use the term “nonprecedential” to describe opinions that the federal appellate courts issue 
but do not consider binding precedent.  These opinions were previously called “unpublished” 
opinions because they were not published in West’s Federal Reporter.  Now, however, virtually all 
federal appellate opinions are published either electronically, in West’s Federal Appendix reporter, 
or both, rendering the term “unpublished” a misnomer.  AMY E. SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW: 
FINDING WHAT YOU NEED WHEN YOU NEED IT 79 (2014); AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: 
TOOLS & STRATEGIES 96-99 (5th ed. 2012). 
 3. For a sampling of scholarship generated by the Anastasoff opinion, see, e.g., Symposium, 
Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions, and “No Citation” Rules, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175-451 
(2001) (collecting eleven articles on the topic); Symposium, Have We Ceased to be a Common Law 
Country? A Conversation on Unpublished, Depublished, Withdrawn and Per Curiam Opinions, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429-1758 (2005) (collecting eleven articles on the topic).   
 4. See generally William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential 
Precedent—Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 
COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978) [hereinafter Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent].  
They wrote more on this topic just a year later.  William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, 
Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807.  
I 
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explained many of the problems that nonprecedential opinions create.5  They are 
unworkable because differentiating in advance opinions that merit precedential 
status from those that do not is impossible.6  Designating some opinions as 
nonprecedential ignores the value of accumulating decisions in an area of the 
law.7  Increasing the number of precedential opinions will not make research as 
cumbersome as proponents fear, and technology will help overcome any 
difficulties that increased publication creates.8  Publication serves the public 
interest in “openness and visibility of decision making.”9  Judges cannot 
accurately distinguish between important (lawmaking) and unimportant or 
routine (dispute-settling) cases at the time they compose opinions.10  Non-
precedential opinions, in conjunction with the then-prevalent no-citation rules, 
create two tiers of justice, undermine institutional controls on the judiciary, and 
are not acceptable.11 
The articles written in the wake of Anastasoff delved into these matters in 
depth and analyzed them from many angles.  To give just a few examples, these 
articles question whether cases resolved through nonprecedential opinions truly 
receive full judicial consideration and argue that lack of public accountability 
likely results in less thorough consideration.12  They argue that conferring on 
judges the prospective ability to determine the precedential value of an opinion 
creates the appearance, if not the reality, of arbitrary decision making.13  They 
explain that nonprecedential opinions developed in response to increased access 
to the federal courts by outsider populations; remain a vehicle for 
institutionalizing unequal treatment of these groups;14 and violate due process,15 
equal protection,16 and duties created by Article III.17  They analyze no-citation 
 
 5. Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent, supra note 4, at 1199-1204.  
 6. Id. at 1189. 
 7. Id. at 1189-90. 
 8. Id. at 1191. 
 9. Id. at 1190. 
 10. Id. at 1192. 
 11. Id. at 1192-1204.  
 12. See, e.g., Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential 
Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 788-91 (2003); Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of 
Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1251 (2004). 
 13. See, e.g., Jeffrey O. Cooper, Citability and the Nature of Precedent in the Courts of 
Appeals: A Response to Dean Robel, 35 IND. L. REV. 423, 428 (2002); Scott E. Gant, Missing the 
Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 
B.C. L. REV. 705, 726-32 (2006); Bradley Scott Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated by 
Rule?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 690-91 (2006); Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: 
Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions by Statute or Procedural Rule, 79 IND. L.J. 711, 732 
(2004).  
 14. See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the 
U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1504-14 (2004). 
 15. Id. at 1450. 
 16. See, e.g., Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 29 VT. L. REV. 555, 574-91 (2005); Melissa H. Weresh, The Unpublished, Non-
Precedential Decision: An Uncomfortable Legality?, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175, 195-96 
(2001). 
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rules18 and argue for different ways of treating nonprecedential opinions to avoid 
these problems.19  They identify new shortcuts the federal appellate courts have 
adopted to manage their caseloads.20  All add to the conversation.  But whether 
they cite Professor Richman or not (and virtually all of them do), all owe 
something to The Non-Precedential Precedent.  These articles develop and 
debate the same justifications for and concerns about nonprecedential opinions 
that Professors Richman and Reynolds analyzed in 1978 when they laid the 
groundwork for much of the work that followed. 
The Non-Precedential Precedent was the first of many articles Professor 
Richman wrote analyzing the appellate courts’ decision-making processes.  He 
did not focus narrowly on the problem of nonprecedential opinions.  Rather, he 
looked at the big picture of appellate decision making to analyze how the appeals 
process could be improved.  He continued to critique no-citation rules.21  Other 
areas he critiqued include excessive reliance on clerks and court staff to draft 
opinions22 and the failure to expand the federal judiciary to meet the needs of the 
public, focusing especially on judges’ own opposition to increasing their ranks to 
maintain their privileged position.23 
A few things have changed over the course of Professor Richman’s 
academic career, but a number of the problems he identified persist.  The no-
citation rules are gone,24 and as he predicted, technology has completely altered 
 
 17. See generally Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: Toward a Thick Doctrine of 
Article III Duty; or Why the Federal Circuits’ Nonprecedential Status Rules are (Profoundly) 
Unconstitutional, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 955 (2009). 
 18. See generally Patrick J. Schiltz, Response, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the 
Federal Courts of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23 (2005); Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About 
Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005); Sarah E. Ricks, A Modest Proposal for Regulating Unpublished, Non-
Precedential Federal Appellate Opinions While Courts and Litigants Adapt to Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 32.1, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 17 (2007) (analyzing Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 32.1). 
 19. See, e.g., Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West’s Federal Appendix: The 
Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 22-24 (2002); Amy E. Sloan, 
If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em: A Pragmatic Approach to Nonprecedential Opinions in the 
Federal Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REV. 895, 927-51 (2008).  See also Andrew T. Solomon, 
Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for Ethical Problems & Legal Malpractice?, 
26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185 (2006-2007) (describing research problems that nonprecedential opinions 
create). 
 20. See, e.g., Amy E. Sloan, The Dog that Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of 
Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 714 (2009). 
 21. William M. Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1723, 1723 (2005); William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More Federal 
Judgeships, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 37 (1999). 
 22. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Appellate Justice, Bureaucracy and 
Scholarship, 21 MICH. J.L. REFORM 623, 627-28 (1988). 
 23. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New 
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 277 (1996); 
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Justice and More Judges, 15 J.L. & POL. 559, 563-
64 (1999). 
 24. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1. 
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the way legal research is conducted.25  But the federal appellate courts issue the 
vast majority of their opinions—over 80%—as nonprecedential.26  Judges 
increasingly rely on law clerks and staff attorneys to work on “routine” cases.27 
Controversy over the appropriate number of appellate judges continues and 
comes not only from the judiciary, but from other quarters as well.  This issue 
arose most recently with respect to vacancies on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.28 
Although there is still much room for improvement in the federal appellate 
courts, Professor William Richman set a worthy precedent by challenging these 
courts to operate with transparency and legitimacy.  His work will continue to 
resonate as long as those of us committed to improving the quality of federal 
appellate justice keep following that precedent. 
 
 25. See generally SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW, supra note 2; SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL 
RESEARCH, supra note 2. 
 26. For the 12-month period ending September 30, 2012, 81.4% of all federal appellate 
opinions were issued as nonprecedential opinions.  U.S. Courts of Appeals—Types of Opinions or 
Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or Submission on Briefs 
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2012, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/tables/S03Sep12.pdf. 
 27. See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff 
Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 13 (2007). 
 28. The controversy arose in conjunction with stalled nominations to the D.C. Circuit and 
culminated in changes to the Senate’s filibuster rules.  Those supporting the President’s nominees 
denounced what they saw as obstructionist tactics to keep them off the bench.  Those opposed to 
the President’s nominees did not object to the nominees’ qualifications but argued that the court’s 
case load did not justify appointment of a full complement of judges.  Russell Wheeler, Judicial 
Nominations and Confirmations: Fact and Fiction, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 30, 2013, 10:33 AM), 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2013/12/30-staffing-federal-judiciary-2013-no-
breakthrough-year#; Jeremy W. Peters, Republicans Again Reject Obama Pick for Judiciary, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2013, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/13/us/politics/senate-
blocks-judicial-nominee-with-filibuster.html?_r=0.  See also Glenn Kessler, The Fact Checker: Is 
the D.C. Circuit Last in ‘Almost Every Category’?, WASH. POST (June 6, 2013, 6:00 AM ET), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/is-the-dc-circuit-last-in-almost-every-
category/2013/06/05/a589b186-ce22-11e2-8f6b-67f40e176f03_blog.html. 
